

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

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S E C R E T MBFR VIENNA 0486

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: DISCUSSION OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
IN MBFR

1. THE FOLLOWING REPORT OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN WLODZIMIERZ
WIECZOREK, MEMBER OF POLISH DEL, AND US DEL OFF (ACDA REP
LEHMAN) MAY BE OF INTEREST TO WASHINGTON AGENCIES CONCERNED
WITH MBFR MATTERS.

2. AT SOCIAL OCCASION DEC 4, WIECZOREK TOOK INITIATIVE TO
ENGAGE DEL OFF IN CONVERSATION. HE SAID THE EAST WAS VERY
INTERESTED TO KNOW WHAT COULD POSSIBLY BE ADDED IN THE NEXT
ROUND TO MAKE THE WESTERN PROPOSAL MORE EQUAL TO THAT OF THE
EASTERN. DELOFF REPLIED THAT, IN LIGHT OF THE OBJECTIVES
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, US CONSIDERED THE WEST'S PROPOSAL TO BE
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FAIR AND EQUITABLE. THE THREAT TO THE STABILITY OF THE POLITICAL/

MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE WAS TO BE FOUND IN THE GROSS DISPARITY IN CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES AND ESPECIALLY IN TANK FORCES. THE EAST HAD A TWO AND ONE-HALF TO ONE ADVANTAGE IN TANKS, AN IMBALANCE THAT DIRECTLY THREATENED THE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY BALANCE IN THE NGA. A MUTUAL BALANCED REDUCTION AGREEMENT COULD NOT IMPROVE THE STABILITY OF THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE IN EUROPE -- AND HENCE THE SECURITY OF BOTH EAST AND WEST -- WITHOUT REDUCING THAT AWESOME DISPARITY.

3. WIECZOREK RESPONDED THAT FOREGOING ANALYSIS WAS NOT FAIR BECAUSE OF WEST'S "OTHER CAPABILITIES." HE SAID ONE MUST NOT FORGET "THE BELT" (PRESUMABLY REFERRING TO ADM'S) AND OBSERVED THAT WEST MIGHT FEAR EAST'S TANKS, BUT THAT THE EAST FEARED WESTERN PERSHING'S EVEN MORE.

4. DELOFF RESPONDED THAT, AS WIECZOREK KNEW QUITE WELL, THE ENTIRE NATO MILITARY POSTURE WAS ONE OF DEFENSE AND THAT ONE OBVIOUSLY DID NOT TAKE CONTROL OF POLAND THROUGH THE USE OF PERSHING'S. THE COMPLETELY OFFENSE-ORIENTED MAKEUP OF EASTERN GROUND FORCES, HOWEVER, POSED A DIRECT THREAT OF INVASION TO WESTERN EUROPE. MOREOVER, IF IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT, A BREAKTHROUGH OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF THE GROSS GROUND FORCE AND TANK IMBALANCE, THIS WOULD RAISE IMMEDIATELY THE SPECTER OF THERMONUCLEAR WAR. THE ANSWER, THEREFORE, OBVIOUSLY WAS TO BRING ABOUT A CONVENTIONAL BALANCE WHERE NEITHER SIDE WAS IN A POSITION TO OVERWHELM THE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSES OF THE OTHER THROUGH FORCE OF NUMBERS. THE CURRENT WESTERN PROPOSAL OF PHASED REDUCTION TO A COMMON CEILING THEREFORE WAS A FAIR AND EQUITABLE POSITION.

5. WIECZOREK REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT THINK DELOFF WAS BEING SERIOUS. EAST HAD READ WITH GREAT INTEREST THE NEWSPAPER ARTICLES COMING FROM WASHINGTON REGARDING THE INTENTIONS OF WASHINGTON TO REDUCE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN MBFR. EAST WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN THE BROOKINGS STUDY RECOMMENDING A REDUCTION OF SUCH TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO 2,000. DELOFF RESPONDED THAT FOR SOME TIME THERE HAD BEEN SPECULATION IN THE PRESS THAT THESE ISSUES WOULD BE DEALT WITH AT VIENNA AND SUGGESTED THAT BROOKINGS DID NOT SPEAK FOR THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION IN ANY WAY, NOR DID IT OFTEN REFLECT THE THINKING OF SECRETARIES KISSINGER OR SCHLESINGER. WESTERN PROPOSAL REMAINED UNCHANGED.

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6. DELOFF THEN ASKED WIECZOREK WHAT LATTER WOULD PROPOSE TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEXT ROUND TO A SUBSTANTIVE REDUCTION, IF EACH HAD POWER OF DECISION FOR HIS SIDE. WIECZOREK RESPONDED THAT THE ANSWER WAS PERFECTLY OBVIOUS. HE WOULD OFFER TO REDUCE THAT WHICH THE WEST FEARED MOST IN RETURN FOR THE WEST'S REDUCING THAT WHICH THE EAST FEARED MOST. DOING SO, WIECZOREK SAID WOULD BE THE BASIS FOR A DEAL. RESOR

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